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U.S.- SOVIET COMPETITIVE INTERVENTION:
RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT
INTRODUCTION
Scholars have disagreed about the nature of the international system
The initial post-war period has been
since the second world war.
characterized as 11 bipolar, 11 with the Soviet Union and the United States as the
major powers. Some analysts detected a loosening of this bipolarity and the
emergence of 11 multipolar 11 tendencies, beginning roughly in 1958 ~ith vehement
French and Chinese criticism of their respective alliance leaders (such
cri ti ci sm had begun long before, as we now know). At least one recent
behavioral study, measuring the degree of global system bipolarity, has
highlighted a slow and relatively steady decline of economic, diplomatic, and
military bipolarity and bipolar dependency -relations after a peak in the
mid-1950's. By criteria such as military spending, the US and USSR jointly
accounted for more than soi of ~orld 11 power 11 until 1979. In some years during
this "bipolar" era the US had nearly a 2 to 1 lead over the Soviets. Detente
in the 1970s seemed to lower bipolarity and bipolar dependencies markedly, and
also to equalize US and Soviet military power.(1)
By certain interpretations then, the post-war international system was
"unipolar" at least through the 1960s, with the United States as the dominant
world military and economic power, and the Soviet Union as an aspiring
competitor.
(2)
The Chinese and Europeans were extremely inferior in
military capability throughout most of .the period (though China made very good
use of its forces in the Korean War). Whi 1e Europe and Japan made rapid
economic strides, they 1agged considerably behind the Americans through the
mid-sixties. Thus, there were few effective rivals to American world economic
and military power prior to 1970.
'
The 1ast fifteen years, however, have witnessed the first transformation
in this American-dominated era.
Though sti 11 trailing in economic
efficiency/productivity and high technology, the Soviet Union, spurred by the
humiliation of the Cuban missile crisis and by Chinese competition, made
important and clear progress in both conventional and nuclear military
capability.
By most calculations--including those of the International
Institute for Strategic Studies--rough . military parity prevails between the
superpowers, albeit at levels somewhat less dominant over the rest of the
world than before.
With its first trade imbalances of the early 1970's,
Washington also experienced a genuine economic challenge from, and in some
products, clear inferiority to European Community members and Japan. For the
first time since World War II, American decision-makers faced an environment
with serious and equally potent rivals.
This study focuses on the ways in which U.S. and Soviet "security
managers" dealt militarily with the unipolar or nearly bipolar system before
1970 and the more competitive, some might even say 11 bimultipolar 11 (3) system
since that time. The historical record could provide clues as to whether they
have adjusted sufficiently to the new demands of a more complicated
international system to avoid superpower war.
The stakes in such an
adjustment are, of course, monumental, and include the survival of this
planet.
·
In a geo-political system in which one power dominates, it is like l y that
the other power will learn when to give way, and when to assume it is safe to

be assertive. Since the days of Kennan and Acheson, American policy-makers
anticipated a global reach of Soviet influence, and sought to contain or
diminish this reach. Eastern Europe became a relatively exclusive Soviet
sphere of influence, and American 1eaders had to worry about stepping to.o
close to vital U.S.S.R. interests in North Korea and later in North Vietnam.
The fact that Soviet forces could hit U.S. Asian and European allies also gave
Washington pause, even if Moscow could not reach the U.S. mainland. But most
of the time, U.S. leaders were relatively free to intervene and extend
American power without much fear of Soviet counter-measures.
Moscow, on the other hand, had to be acutely conscious of American or
American allies' dominance in most regions. Soviet leaders mainly relied on
political and aid ties to states outside their irmnediate geographical
neighborhood; they were not equipped for military involvements and for the
possibility of direct confrontation with the West in distant regions.
For American 1eaders those relatively secure and self-assured days are
gone now. Although the Soviet Union may still be quite reticent about direct
confrontation, the Soviet navy is much more formidable than in the days of the
Cuban missile crisis, the Soviet nuclear arsenal is larger and much more
diverse than in the days of Suez (when the West could largely ignore
Khrushchev I s nuclear threats), and Soviet tank forces are much 1arger than in
the days of the Berlin crises. Washington security managers now drive on
uncharted roads, with a seemingly greater prospect of meeting dangerous
oncoming traffic.
Moscow's security managers have, of course, had less experience than
their U.S. counterparts in handling their own major power status and avoiding
over-commitments. {4) Even as 1ate as in Brezhnev's era, Moscow bas i ca 11 y
ignored the deaths of Soviet personnel in U.S. saturation bombings of Vietnam;
it has been argued that the u.s.s.R. will not risk world war to defend Third
World clients such as Syria. Yet can one be sure that Savi et 1eaders wi 11
continue to step back from military confrontation with the other superpower
when they have the means to engage in such confrontations? What is the value
of Moscow's friendship and security treaties in such circumstances?
Furthermore, deci si on-making pressures are mounting in both Washington
and Moscow, with rapidly advancing and threatening nuclear technologies, the
potential spread of nuclear weapons in Asia and Latin America, and newly
revived mutual political hostility. Soviet leaders have been faced with
exceedingly accurate American missiles able to reach the Soviet heartland from
submarines and from Europe. Even if the Reagan Administration is replaced by
one less stridently hostile to the Soviet policial system, the U.S.S.R. will
be on notice as to the fragility of detentes.
If trust is an important
element in regulating a bimultipolar world, it is also likely to be scarce in
the last years of the century.
CAPABILITIES, HOSTILITIES AND SUPERPOWER INTERVENTION
Superpower confrontation and the danger of major war in the coming years
seem most likely to stem from simultaneous foreign interventions. While World
War III or a severe crisis such as those in Cuba or Berlin could erupt merely
from political disputes, the physical presence of one superpower's forces or
advisors in or near countries considered strategically important to the other
could set off chain reactions of dangerous combat.
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Intervention depends in part on the threats parties perceive in foreign
disputes, on their capabilities to project m1l1tary power or assistance across
borders or overseas, on their political will to do so, and on their general
economic and political expansiveness. Expansiveness here entails not merely
conquering foreign territory, but developing interests in foreign events, and
needs for foreign contacts during periods of internal growth and/or perceived
external threat. (5) Economic growth increases demands for foreign goods and
services, and affords a state more capabilities with which to intervene
militarily abroad. Expansive states are more likely to encounter foreign
hos ti l i ti es as their spheres of interest and influence intersect those of
other expansive states. Occasions for competitive intervention, therefore,
increase. The will to intervene also depends on such factors as capability
and threat perception, and on success or failure in prior interventions.
In past studies it has been determined that the U.S. and u.s.s.R. seldom
have intervened with troops in the same place at the same time. (6} However,
little is known about the pattern of action and reaction once intervention by
one party has taken place, action and reaction involving forms of intervention
short of, as well as including troop movements. In the years to come, such
action-reaction patterns will determine whether superpower confrontations
escalate to dangerous levels. It is important, therefore, to chart the
patterns of U.S. - Soviet involvments in unfolding foreign disputes: during
periods of U.S. dominance vs. relative equality; during periods of U.S. or
Soviet expansiveness; and during periods of great mutual hostility and
perceived threat~- periods of detente.
A series of hypotheses concerning mutual superpower interventions can be
derived from the observation that the Soviets and Americans have been
extremely reluctant to escalate involvements in the face of probable
confrontation with the other side.
"It would not be incorrect to contend that military conflicts occur
only in situations where the superpowers are not directly
confronting each other, or over which both of them do not feel an
equally deep and intimate commitment so as to get directly involved
at the s.ame time and to the same extent." (7)
The trend throughout the "cold war" peri ad has been to cooperate by conceding
areas of greater interest to the superpower most concerned, not to confront
the other superpower with major mi 1 i tary forces, and to shy away even from
joint "peacekeeping" offers, as in Suez (1956) or the Congo (1960).
Therefore, the following hypotheses seem plausible: and will be tested in
this analysis for the years 1945-1975:
Hypothesis 1-- we would expect that when levels of superpower military
involvement in a foreign dispute escalate and become more nearly equal, the
tendency will be for one or the other superpower to retire from the fray and
decrease its level of involvement significantly;
Hypothesis 2-- in periods when one superpower is clearly predominant in
mi l itary capability, we would expect the inferior power consistently to back
down in the face of mutual involvement, while in periods of rough superpower
equality, we would expect the power with the least traditional i nvolvement in
the disputed area to give way;
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Hypothesis 3-- if a superpower is undergoing a period of marked foreign
expansiveness (in terms of foreign contacts, commitments, and the development
of military forces capable of distant deployment) and internal industrial
growth, we would expect it to challenge superpower opponents at higher levels
of mutual intervention than during less expansive periods; however, ultimately
it may sti 11 back down if confronted by superior mi 1i tary power or its
opponent's strong traditional interest in the area; and
Hypothesis 4-- during periods of high mutual hostility and tension, we would
expect superpowers to compete at much higher 1evel s of mutual intervention,
and to give way less frequently to opponents than during periods of relative
detente. ( 8)
Operationalization of Key Concepts
The concept of intervention employed in this study encompasses the array
of means by which a superpower can influence a target nation's policies.
Thus, intervention will be broken down into various levels; conservatively,
these levels will be interpreted as a nominal scale, although there is a
general ordinal development from non-involvement to full scale military
operations. Covert and overt intervention also will be distinguished for each
1eve 1 of i nvo 1vement.
On 1y US and Soviet governmenta 1 . (as opposed to
mercenary or private) interventions in the "Third World" will be considered.
The intervention ·levels chosen for this analysis are as follows (9):
LEVEL NUMBER

INVOLVEMENT

0

Uninvolved

1

Diplomatic methods,
including embassy activities

2

Propaganda and generalized
threats

3

Planning or advisory participation (including organized subversion)

4

Materials (including financial
support)

5

Passive military support (overflight rights, explicit threats,
etc.)

6

Limited military support

7

Large scale military support

8

War

It will be assumed that interventions prior to 1965 occurred in a period
of marked U.S. military superi ority; that interventions between 1966 and 1970
occurred in a transitional period, with the U.S.S.R. gaining rapi dly i n
projectable military power; and that interventions si nce 1971 have occurred in

::,

a period of rough and developing equality. Periods of great U.S. - Soviet
hostility and tension will be identified in conjunction with major crises,
such as Korea, Berlin, and Cuba, and according to historical accounts of
detentes.
Two measures of international expansiveness will be used: percentage of
yearly growth in foreign trade and in military expenditure. ( 10} Trade
represents expanded industrial, agricultural, or raw material production,
leading to foreign sales and purchases-- an outreach to the external world.
Military expenditures generally indicate that a government intends to prepare
for conflictual encounters with other nations. (11}
Expansiveness measures, as well as measures of the intensity of U.S. Soviet rivalry, can also be used to demarcate periods during the 11 cold war. 11
For instance, Gamson and Modigliani have identified several phases according
to major Soviet or American hostile or concili.atory actions; these will be
used to measure superpower hostility and threat perception.
11

The first short phase runs from the beginning of the Cold War to
the announcement of the Truman Doctrine in March, 1947. This phase
is characterized by relatively belligerent Western behavior and
varied or erratic Soviet behavior. • •The second phase begins in
1947 and lasts until the beginning of the stalemate in Korea
following full-seal e Chinese entry into the war.
It is
characterized by relatively belligerent behavior and refractory
responses by both coalitions • • • the Korean stalemate begins the
third phase, which ends with the almost simultaneous interventions
in the Suez and Hungary in October and November, 1956.
It is
characterized by relatively accommodative behavior and an unusually
high percentage of conciliatory responses by both sides. • •The
fourth phase begins with Suez-Hungary and ends with the Cuban
missile crisis in October, 1962 • • • Both sides tended to respond in
a refractory fashion to a range of patterns; however the Savi et
coalition also responded to Western belligerence in a conciliatory
fashion on a number of occasions • • • The final phase runs from the
Cuban missile crisis to the end of our analysis in November, 1963.
The few interaction units here, like those of the third phase,
reflect mutual accommodation. 11 (12}
Expansiveness data al so can be broken down by periods during the cold
Five major cold war
phases can be identified in the trade and military expenditure figures. (13)
The first phase, 1946-49, saw i ni ti ally increased but then declining trade
growth (military figures unavailable} for both countries. This trend was
sharply, though only briefly broken from 1950 to 1955 by the Korean conflict.
There followed relatively parallel U.S. - U.S.S.R. trade growth fluctuations
from 1956-62, along with the beginnings of military build-ups by both
countries in 1960. The 1963-69 period saw a levelling off of both countries'
trade growth at roughly 10%, while military expenditure growth increased
sharply, though not uniformly, in the Vietnam and post-Cuban missile crisis
era. The final period saw a remarkably similar pattern in U.S. and Soviet
trade growth, though with some divergence at the end, and a decline in rates
of military growth to near zero percent-- this despite periodic scare
headlines in both countries about the other's buildups.

war, to compare to the Gamson-Modigliani periodization.

Differences

between

expansiveness

periods

and

periods

identified

0

according to hos ti 1 i ty 1evel s by Gamson and Modigliani are noteworthy. The
latter's first phase of marked hostility and political competition was not, on
the whole, characterized by mutual expansiveness.
Trade and military
dislocations caused by the Korean War seemed to increase superpower
expansiveness, but in Gamson/Modigliani's behavioral analysis, greater mutual
conciliation prevailed. The post-Suez pattern was mixed in both analyses,
with somewhat greater but fluctuating expansiveness and a breakdown of the
brief "spirit of Camp David" detente.
Oetente returned in the 1960 1 s
following the missile crisis, but trade and military spending grew markedly at
the same time. Any relationship would seem to be inverse, i.e., the greater
the expansive pressure, the more general mutual conciliation and wariness in
the two superpowers' behavior.
Finally, it appears unlikely that an expansive U.S. would have
encountered a simultaneously expansive U.S~S.R. during these cold war periods.
As reflected in the trade and military expenditure data from 1946-73, measures
of U.S. and Soviet e.xpansi oni st pressures were only moderately correlated
(product moment correlations: .52 for yearly trade growth, and .42 for
military expenditure growth).
Furthermore, negligible correlation was
observed between economic and strategic expansiveness, as reflected in low
correlations between the trade of one power and the military expenditures of
the other.
A ful 1 test of the four hypotheses 1i sted above would require a large
sampling of U.S. and Soviet interventions from each period since World War II.
Because the action-reaction sequences in such intervention cases are complex
and require detailed investigation, only a small sampling of selected cases
from each period will be presented here. The cases were all selected from the
Middle East, in order to provide some continuity of context. They include:
the Turkish Straits conflict (1945-46); the Turkish-Syrian border dispute
(1955-57); the Arab-Isaeli Six Day War (1967); and the Arab-Israeli Yorn Kippur
War (1973).
COMPETITIVE INTERVENTION CASES
Turkish Straits Confrontation
The first case considered, and outlined in Table 1, concerns the "Turkish
Straits" conflict of 1945-46.
This · case occurred during a period of
unquestioned U.S. military superiority and atomic monopoly, though in a
location which favored Soviet forces logistically.
The new Truman
Administration was, furthermore, engaged increasingly in a test of wills with
Moscow regarding post-war relations in the Balkans and Asia Minor, including
Iran. While the Soviet Union still reeled economically and militarily from
the effects of war and disrupted international trade channels, both countries
were, at least for a short post-war period, quite expansive. U.S. trade grew
by 45%, for example, between 1946 and 1 47, with Soviet trade growth following
at 34%.
We look for trends in mutual superpower intervention escalation or
deescalation. Basically, in March 1945 the Soviet Union notified Turkey that
it was dissatisfied with the arrangements of the Montreux Convention of 1939.
Moscow feared that Turkey conceivably could seal off the straits leading to
the Mediterranean, blocking Soviet vessels while permitting free wartime
passage to nations hostile to Soviet interests • . Stalin considered the
Convention a "scrap of paper" which should be supplemented with "effect i ve
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guarantees," conceivably such as stationing Soviet forces within range of the
Bosporus and Dardanelles under the type .of long-term lease proposed during
negotiations with Nazi Germany in 1940.
Stalin's views on Montreux
inadequacies had received relatively favorable hearings from Churchill and
Roosevelt during the Moscow and Yalta conferences of 1944 and '45. (14)
In June 1945, the Soviet Union further demanded cession of Kars and
Ardahan provinces, acquired by Turkey from the fledgling u.s.s.R. in 1918.
The major Soviet oil port, Batum, was just beyond the border at Ardahan, and
the Americans and British had been interested in the area during the war.
While Britain reportedly urged Turkey to resist Soviet demands, the U.S.,
still reflecting Roosevelt's precepts and hopes for post-war Big Three
cooperation, refused to become directly involved in the matter. The Straits
issue had come to a stands ti 11 at the Potsdam Conference in June, al though the
powers generally followed the Yalta guidelines that the Montreux Convention
needed revision and that the three powers would each conduct direct
negotiations with Turkey. (15)
Thus, the initial U.S.S.R. post-war involvement in Turkey was on overt
levels one and two (see levels outlined above). Indeed, Moscow evidently was
proceeding along what it assumed to be a path approved at wartime summits to
secure its age old interests in the Straits. It waited until August of 1946
formally to request revision of the Convention by Turkey. By that time,
however, Soviet moves were no longer being interpreted in Washington as
fulfi 11 i ng wartime agreements, but rather as challenging those agreements and
seeking control of such regions as the Middle East. (16).
Initial demonstrable U.S. involvement occurred on levels one, two, and
three, in conjunction with Great Britain. President Truman wrote the Turkish
government in August 1945 suggesting that an international conference be
convened. Truman did not volunteer U.S. participation at the conference, but
made cl ear that any agreement reached by the Black Sea powers would have to
guarantee Turkey's sovereignty and independence.
The Soviet reply of August 7 maintained that the Straits' regulation was
solely a matter for the Black Sea powers, and suggested that the U.S.S.R. and
Turkey jointly organize the Straits' defenses. {17) Large scale Soviet troop
mobilizations along the Bulgarian-Turkish border in October and November
punctuated these suggestions. Turkey responded by escalating its own military
build-up, further straining the post-war Turkish economy. However, even in
the midst of these tensions, the U.S.S.R. also assured the Western powers, and
hence the Turks, that no invasion was planned. (18)
Determined to prevent Soviet expansion, the U.S. moved both
diplomatically and militarily in 1946, reiterating its support for a U.N.
negotiated solution, but ultimately strengthening its rejection of Soviet
terms by dispatching a task force into the Mediterranean as well. In so
doing, Truman made his famous remark that, "We might as well find out whether
the Russi ans are bent on world conquest now as in five or ten years. 11 ( 19)
In September the U.S. Navy announced the permanent stationing of what later
became the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean {as early as February, naval
"courtesy calls" had begun).
Soviet demands were largely dropped at this point in the face of
diplomatic and passive U.S. military support for Turkey. Even in formally
requesting revision of the Straits regime, the Soviets had not applied all
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procedures for withdrawing from that regime.
However, the Truman
administration went on with the Truman Doctrine in 1947. Thus, a temporary
show of support for Turkey was replaced by long-term economic and military
comnitments with which the Soviets could not compete. One consequence of
these commitments, however, was that Moscow came to view Turkey not merely as
a British client and potential impediment to the Straits, but as a U.S.
outpost near the Soviet heartland. (20)
The initial U.S.S.R. intervention on overt level two was countered by
American involvement on overt levels two and three. Moscow probed U.K., U.S.,
and Turkish reactions further by massing troops on the Turkish border, overt
level five, as well as by reportedly seeking influence on the Turkish
elections.
Moving rapidly up the scale, Washington countered with
interventions on overt levels two, three, four, and five. It was an expansive
moment for American foreign po 1icy as President Truman and the State
Department perceived and portrayed a global Soviet threat rather than simply a
regional conflict in which Britain could no longer prevail.
Several other major disputes complicated the decision-making in the
Turkish confrontation. U.S. Middle Eastern involvement during the same period
included interventions in Iran and Greece, and events in Turkey coincided with
a Yugoslavian attack on two American aircraft. Modes of U.S. and Soviet
interaction in Turkey and Iran were somewhat similar. The Soviets were in a
stronger military position in Iran, with troops still stationed in the North
in support of breakaway provinces. Yet the Iran crisis was settled largely
through relatively adroit Iranian negotiations in Moscow concerning oil
concessions and security issues. In both cases the Soviets applied political
and military pressure as 1946 deadlines approached-- either for filing
protests to the Montreux Convention (August) or for withdrawal from Iran
(March} under wartime agreements. When the pressure was resisted, or even
slightly and temporarily accommodated by local authorities as in Iran, the
u.s.s.R. conveniently dropped the claims. (21)
Power was a crucial variable in the types of intervention employed. The
u.s.S.R. was unable to compete with Americans in mobilizing economic or
military supplies, and had to rely on rather crude threats of a large standing
army. The mobility of the American navy proved a great advantage, but a naval
strategy was also dictated by the rapid . demobilization of American forces; the
U.S. posture consisted mainly of symbolic military presence backed by huge
financial resources.
The fact that military conflict did not result from the interventions
indicates that the u.s.s.R., at least, did not regard the Turkish issue as
worthy of the political, let alone the military risks involved. The Truman
Doctrine had not yet been enunciated, and the Soviets evidently still valued
and hoped for cooperation on spheres of influence in central Europe, a far
more crucial area than either Turkey or Iran. (22)
Jurkish -Syrian Border Dispute, 1955-57
Aside from the Korean war, which even included a brief hostile encounter
as the U.s. bombed Soviet territory, there were relatively few competitive
Soviet - American interventions outside Europe between 1942 and 1955, and
certainly few in the Middle East. Gamson and Modigliani's description of
developing tacit accommodation and conciliation, even in the midst of bitter
propaganda, seems generally accurate. For example, the U.S.S.R. stayed mainly
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on
the
sidelines,
applauding
but
not
intervening,
during
the
British-American-Iranian oil nationalization crisis of 1952-53. Even when the
Iranian army, with C.I.A. support, displaced Premier Mossadeq and reinstated
the Shah, Moscow remained uninvolved, and relatively unconcerned during a
subsequent crackdown on the Tudeh Party. (23)
The U.S. and u.s.s.R. were, at least in 1951, quite expansive in trade
and military preparation, but the Americans were still afforded relatively
wide latitude for intervention and even alliance building (the Baghdad Pact)
near the Soviet border.
The Soviets evidently merely tried to maintain
businesslike relations with states penetrated by American influence, and to
convince those states' leaders not to allow offensive operations against
Soviet territory.
After 1955, however, Moscow 1eaders began to see more value in closer
relations with Third World states. Their dealings with Egyptian President
Nasser, and his successful offensive against the Baghdad Pact, convinced them
that the Middle East was not simply a British-American stronghold. Moscow's
more active and ardent support of non-aligned leaders resulted in new
confrontations with the United States.
There was little growth in expansive pressure--trade or military
spending-- in the first part of the 1956-62 period. Nevertheless, the cold
war heated up again from Suez to Hungary, including the Turkish - Syrian
border. As revealed in the Eisenhower Doctrine of January 1957, American
policy had become highly responsive to any perceived Soviet Middle Eastern
incursions. · Already stung by Nasser's assertiveness, American leaders were
alanned at the prospect of Syria becoming a Soviet "satellite" which might
further disrupt the Middle Eastern status-quo.
·The gradual warming of Soviet - Syrian relations culminated in a Syrian
delegation's visit to Moscow in July 1957, and a long term Soviet economic and
military loan agreement for $500-million. Syria turned to the Soviets for aid
after U.S. offers-- for less money and at over twice the interest rate-- had
proved unacceptable. Nevertheless, the Soviet agreement was controversial in
Damascus, and touched off political upheaval among nationalist and pro-Soviet
parties. (24)
American involvement developed one week after the Syrian - Soviet
agreement, on August 13, as three U.S. diplomats were expelled from Syria.
The evidence indicates that, as Damascus maintained, the three were trying to
foment at least a change in Syria's military leadership, if not an outright
regime overthrow.
(25)
The American diplomatic plot had undesired
consequences, as President Quwatli conducted an extensive purge of government
and mi 1 i ta ry personne 1 • Pro-Soviet of fi c i a 1 s and officers took over vacated
posts.
Perhaps in response to these moves, the U.S. dispatched Loy Henderson
from the State Department to 11 assess 11 the Middle Eastern situation. The truth
of Soviet cl aims that Henderson was sent to "organize an attack by Arab
countries against Syria II is sti 11 open to conjecture, but clearly part of his
mission was to align Turkey as an instrument for further U.S. intervention in
the area. (26) Ankara had been warning of increased Soviet military aid to
Syria since late 1956, had concentrated troops on its southern border in the
spring of 1957, and played host to dissident Syrian exiles during the summer.
( 27)
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Increased Soviet influence in Syria and Henderson's presence prompted
Moscow's proposal to Britain, France, and the U.S. for a mutual agreement not
to use force in the Middle East. The West had twice previously r'ejected the
same offer. (28) Washington again brushed aside such proposals, this time
with a military flourish. On September 5, Washington announced that military
supplies would be airlifted to Jordan, Lebanon, and Iraq. Eisenhower warned
that Syria was in danger of violating the Eisenhower Doctrine, and positioned
the Sixth Fleet off the Syrian coast. At the same time, Turkey began military
maneuvers along the Syrian border, a traditional Turkish method of influencing
Syria, employed already with success in April and May 1957 to discourage
Syrian support to revolutionary elements in Jordan. (29)
Tension remained high throughout September.
Soviet propaganda
denunciations began on the 10th, and on the 13th the Kremlin issued a warning
letter to Ankara. For maximal effect, Soviet forces along the Turkish border
were mobilized, and on the 19th a naval squadron arrived on "courtesy call" at
the Syrian port of Latakia. The U.S. responded with a series of objections to
Soviet "intimidation" of the Turks. (30) Reports from Damascus indicated
that Syria was preparing for i11111ediate military action, with cancelled leaves,
closed roads, and defense committee meetings.
Tension dissipated quickly in October as various parties seemed to tire
of or see no further benefit in the confrontation. Khrushchev, perhaps in an
effort to keep the issue alive or to stave off a Turkish attack, appealed to
West European Socialist parties to help prevent aggression. (31) The Soviet
leader was under considerable domestic pressure to consolidate control, and
may have used the crisis to improve his image. Turkish Premier Menderes could
have had similar domestic goals. (32) As late as October 16, perhaps
emboldened by impending settlement, Secretary Dulles warned that in resisting
a Soviet attack on Turkey, the U.S. would not consider u.s.s.R. territory a
privileged sanctuary. (33)
Syrian leaders, by now uncomfortable with their role center stage in a
Soviet - American confrontation, quietly began to negotiate a number of
agreements eventually uniting their country with Egypt. This unification in
1958, and the arrival in Syria of Egyptian troops went far to reassure all
sides that there was no need for further superpower involvement, and to
diminish the role of Co11111unists in the Syrian government.
Thus, again the superpowers escalated their confrontation only to overt
level 5. The U.S. reached that level on September 7, and the Soviets on
September 19, 1957. Unsuccessful in its initial intervention on covert level
3, the United States moved to overt levels 3, 4, and 5. In response, the
u.s.s.R. moved from overt levels 4 to levels 5 and 2; explicit threats,
passive military support, and propaganda campaigns were mounted in defense of
the Syrians. The crisis moderated to level 1, with Soviet appeals to European
Socialists; the U.S. countered with level 2 threats. Tensions abated amidst
toasts, as Khrushchev announced the removal of Marshal Zhukov at a Turkish
embassy reception in Moscow on October 29.
The United States seemed anxious to weaken Soviet influence in the area,
and attempted to do so with a wide variety of diplomatic and military move~.
The Soviet Union, wishing to enhance its Third World image and in the midst of
a domestic power struggl e, took up the challenge, but was somewhat more
conf i ned in its choice of options. Again, Moscow reverted to traditional
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forms of pressure on Turkey. Khrushchev spoke of missiles flying and the
situation getting out of control, but his behavior indicated a desire to
defuse confrontations with a relatively militant Eisenhower Administration.
Finally, it took an Arab initiative to break the deadlock.
Levels of involvement in the Syrian crisis were roughly comparable to
those in other Middle Eastern crises in the same period. In Suez, both the
U.S. and U.S.S.R. reached level 5 toward the end, with obliquely worded Soviet
threats against Britain and France, U.S. counter-threats against the Soviets,
and Washington's strong pressure on Britain and France. Far from materially
aiding Egypt in the fighting, the Savi ets reportedly removed many of their
technical advisors and much military hardware once the Suez invasion began.
(34)
Direct U.S. military intervention was mounted in Lebanon (and British
intervention in Jordan) for a short period in 1958 (overt level 7) after the
demise of the Iraqi regime, the cornerstone of the Baghdad Pact. The Soviet
Union stood mainly on the sideline throughout, issuing veiled warnings to
Turkey not to interfere with the Iraqi revolution, and ca 11 i ng for a five
power sunmit and for U.N. debates on the Middle East (possibly leading to
regional neutralization and arms control).
(35) With significant Arab
powers, such as Egypt, able to exert influence in the region, the main crises
during this period, excepting Suez, were settled largely through inter.Arab or
regional compromise, even in the midst of major power intervention.
Arab - Israeli War, 1967
The first portion of the 1963-68 period was relatively free of
superpower confrontation in the Middle East. The region saw disputes among
"radical" states, and between radical and conservative Arab states in such
. places as Yemen; Egypt went deeply in debt to the U.S.S.R. for military
hardware, and a U.S. - Saudi military aid relationship was established. Both
the superpowers were undergoing moderate expansionist growth; trade figures
increased generally at between five and ten percent, and military expenditures
grew rapidly after 1965. Military and advisory aid to their respective
clients placed the superpowers as high as overt levels 3 and 4 even without
face-to-face intervention in specific disputes. In the wake of the Cuban
missile crisis, the powers were moving hesitantly toward stabilization of
strategic relations and the beginnings· of detente. Increasingly, the U.S.
government became enmeshed in and preoccupied with Vietnam dilemmas.
The major powers were implicated directly as continuing Arab - Israeli
disputes erupted into another international crisis in mid-1967. Guerrilla
raids, conducted from strongholds in Syrian territory, prompted numerous
Israeli retaliatory airstrikes in 1966 and early 1967. Israel's massive
retaliation policy, aided by liberal doses of American military supplies,
further isolated Tel Aviv from its Arab neighbors and precipitated a Syrian Egyptian mutual assistance pact in November 1966.
On May 13, 1967, the Soviet Union evidently to solidify that pact and
protect Syria, intervened at covert level 2, inaccurately informing President
Nasser that Israel had concentrated 11 to 13 brigades on the border preparing
for a massive attack against Syria. (36) Acting on this information, Nasser
put Egyptian troops on maximum alert the next day, and the Cairo press warned
that the defense pact would be honored if Syria were attacked. Moving troops
toward the Sinai front, Nasser went on to demand the removal of U.N. troops
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which had been stationed along the Sinai border since 1956.
The crisis intensified further on May 22, with an Egyptian blockade of
the Gulf of Aqaba, a move met by a violent reaction in Tel Aviv, and
implicating the United States which had reportedly promised Israel in 1956
that the Gulf would be kept open. President Johnson a-sked the Israelis not to
take action against the blockade for 48 hours on the 23rd, and he warned Egypt
that the blockade was illegal and dangerous.
(37}
U.S. ambassadors
immediately undertook initiatives to settle the issue through U.N. and
international negotiations.
The Soviets responded with warnings similar to Johnson's.
The
seriousness of the situation appeared to unite the Russians and Americans in
an effort, including use of the newly established "hot line, 11 to dissuade
their respective clients from taking further action.
In conversation with
Premier Kosygin on May 22, President Johnson said:
"Your and our ties to nations of the area could bring us into
difficulties which I am confident neither of us seeks. It would
appear a time for each of us to use our influence to the full in the
cause of moderation, including our influence over actions by the
United Nations."
In joint consultation, the Israelis and Americans reportedly reached an
understanding that the former would refrain from military action until all
diplomatic channels had been exhausted; the President warned that support for
Israel could be guaranteed only if no conflict were initiated: "Israel will
not be alone unless it decides to go alone." (38) Diplomatic pressure by the
U.N. Secretary General and others also produced an Egyptian promise on May 25
not to attack Israel. But additional Egyptian troops moving toward the Sinai
front and increasing Egyptian boasts and demands intensified the crisis.
The Soviets and Arab states rejected U.S. proposals for a "cooling off"
period, since it would entail opening the Gulf of Aqaba. As several Arab
states pledged support to Egypt and placed military units under Egyptian
co11111and, Israeli leaders began to give up hope of peaceful settlement. U.S.
leaders were aware of the mood in Tel Aviv, and sent the Sixth Fleet to
monitor events. However, as Walter Lacqueur observed;
"On the eve of the war, Russia's hands were as much tied as
America's. But there was also the understanding with America about
non-interference by the super-powers • • • Moscow {like America) would
envisage military action only if major, direct interests of the
Soviet Union were concerned." (39)
On June 5, Israeli planes attacked and virtually destroyed the Egyptian,
Jordanian, and Syrian air forces; the Six Day War was on. Moscow responded
with a Security Council resolution proposing a ceasefire, but despite official
agreement, fighting continued.
Accusing Israel of ignoring the ceasefire
agreement, Premier Kosygin, in a "hot 1i ne" message to President Johnson,
warned of a possible independent Soviet decision to use military force if
hostilities did not cease.
As in the Suez case and in subsequent Middle East wars, the Soviet Union
issued relatively high level threats at the end of the 1967 crisis, especially
when Syria seemed threatened with Israeli occupation. Unlike 1956, however,
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there were no nuclear threats; the missile crisis experience seemed to
heighten awareness of nuclear weapons' extreme dangers. In response to Soviet
threats, the U.S. moved the Sixth Fleet to within 50 miles of the Syrian
coast. (40) U.S. - Soviet tension eased, however, on June 10 as Israel
honored the cease-fire under pressure from Washington.
Throughout the cr1s1s and war period, the U.S. maintained overt
intervention levels 1, 2, and 3, initially seeking diplomatic solutions and
warning against aggressive action. As in prior Middle Eastern confrontations,
the U.S. ultimately reached level 5, with deployment of the Sixth Fleet both
to 9bserve the Israelis (resulting in the sinking of a U.S. warship) and warn
the Soviets.
The Soviets also had moved to level 5, though with explicit
military threats rather than deployments. Soviet moves evidently were more
designed to pressure the Americans to restrain Israel than to confront U.S.
forces. Moscow watched while vast quantities of its equipment were destroyed
in the desert, and significantly, did not offer resupply of vital weapons such
as planes until after the war was over. (41) The superpower game in the
Middle East remained more political than military; the superpowers had
established limits to their competition and clear mutual interest in
restraining clients. However, neither proved capable of preventing clients
from going over the brink of war . . Finally, Soviet presence in Egypt and Syria
was even greater after the disastrous war experience than in the pre-war
period.
Arab - Israeli War, 1973
The most recent superpower political detente, from 1969-75, saw both
powers averaging nearly 20% annual trade increases and neither power
materially increasing its real defense spending. Thus, it was a period of
commercial expansion, at least until the effects of petroleum price increases
were felt, but also one of relatively equal military capability and generally
declining tensions and stable military competition. In the midst of •th.is
detente, symbolized by the Helsinki Accords, came another major Middle Eastern
war.
Prior to that October 1973 conflagration, both superpowers had continued
to support their respective Middle Eastern clients with arms while attempting
to facilitate negotiations. The Soviet Union became intricately involved in
its first direct military intervention ·outside Eastern Europe in 1970, during
the Israeli - Egyptian "war of attrition" along the Suez Canal. Soviet pilots
reportedly flew missions in support of the Egyptian airforce, helping defend
canal cities and strategic targets against Israeli bombing. (42) The close
encounters of Israeli and Soviet forces seemed to chasten both sides, and led
to more serious disengagement negotiations and a three year ceasefire.
This Soviet intervention at level 7 constituted a signal both that Moscow
was serious about preventing the coll apse of Arab clients, and that Soviet
forces could now be more effectively deployed abroad at greater di stances
(indeed had to be so deployed in part to protect the more extensive Soviet
naval fleet which lacked aircraft carriers). (43) This capability would be
displayed further in logistical support of Cuban and East German interventions
in Africa during the 1970 s. The age of rough superpower military parity had
dawned.
1

Moscow - Cairo relations were far cooler and more susp1c1ous in 1973 than
in 1970, however, as Sadat had swept aside a number of the pro-Soviet
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advisors. While Soviet weapons, tactical support, and training were still
needed, Soviet demands, restrictions, and counselling against war with Israel
were not appreciated. The level of desired or permitted Soviet involvement in
future disputes was uncertain, and the Egyptians made much of detente's
potentially hannful effects on Arab interests. {44)
As with threats to Syria in prior crises, fighting between Israel and
Syria in September 1973 engaged Soviet concerns and interests. Moscow finally
agreed to Egypt's war plans, and somewhat stepped up its arms shipments
{though still at levels thought not to threaten Israel strategically).
Evidently the Soviets hoped that Vietnam, Watergate, and commitments to
detente would keep America from intervening. {45)
However, the cautious Kremlin rulers did not embrace the idea of war with
much enthusiasm until i~ became apparent that the Arabs stood a reasonable
chance of success. After a successful initial attack on October 5, President
Sadat later reported, the Soviets encouraged Egypt to accept a cease-fire
after only six hours of fighting. On the war's third day, large quantities of
weapons were finally dispatched to Egypt and Syria by air and sea, "the first
time in an Arab-Israeli conflict that the USSR had aided the Arabs during the
actual fighting." {46)
The U.S. reacted to war's outbreak by seeking immediate diplomatic
solutions through the U.N. Nixon and Brezhnev exchanged communications on
October 7 and 8, leading to the decision to ask for an immediate Security
Council session. {47) When Soviet c~ients seemed to be losing badly in the
1967 fighting, Moscow had initiated ceasefire proposals; American leaders did
the same while Israel reeled in the early fighting of 1973. Meanwhile, the
u.s.s.R. opposed a ceasefire until Israel withdrew to pre-June 1967 borders,
but quickly reversed itself when Israeli forces crossed the Canal into western
Egyptian territory on October 16.
It is now well known that while attempting a diplomatic solution to the
war and a territorial settlement, the U.S., with Henry Kissinger largely
instrumental, held up resupply of Israeli forces. {48) Heavy domestic and
Israeli pressure, and Egypt's unwillingness to embrace the ceasefire that
Israel supported on October 12 finally convinced Nixon and Kissinger to
authorize a massive airlift for Israel. {49) In addition to $825-million in
military assistance, and a Congressional request for an additional
$2.2-billion for Israel, the Sixth Fleet was suddenly noticeable in the
conflict area, thus moving the U.S. once again to level 5.
While the stepped-up U.S. involvement brought on at least a nominal OAPEC
oil embargo on October 17, it, along with a string of Israeli battlefield
successes, also began almost immediately to have effects in Cairo and Moscow.
On the 16th, Premier Kosygin arrived in Cairo evidently to urge a ceasefire;
Egypt accepted on the 19th, convinced that the U.S. involvement doomed any
further campaigns against Israel. {50) With the Egyptian army in imminent
jeopardy, Kissinger was urgently invited to Moscow on the 20th and the two
powers agreed on a ceasefire. Their clients fought on, however, with Israel
nearly surrounding the Egyptian Third Army on the 24th. Cairo appealed to the
superpowers jointly to send peacekeeping troops, a request promptly refused
by Washington.
Apparently interpreting the U.S. refusal as designed to allow Israel
greater strategic advantage, the Soviets raised the pressure on Washington and
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Tel Aviv by dispatching transport planes to southern Soviet bases and by
alerting and concentrating unusually large military forces in southern Soviet
republics.
The Soviet Mediterranean fleet also evidently was expanded.
Shortly after the White House received intelligence reports of this military
activity on the 24th, Brezhnev contacted Nixon with following message:
11

1 will say it straight that if you find it impossible to act
together with us i-n this matter, we should be faced with the
necessity urgently to consider the question of taking appropriate
steps unilaterally. 11 (51)
It now appears that unilateral Soviet actions would have involved
resupply efforts for the Third Army, rather than a combat military
intervention, but responding to the uncertainties of the moment, Kissinger on
behalf of Nixon, on the one hand placed American military forces on a
world-wide high status alert, and on the other applied renewed pressure on
Israel to halt their advances. As a diplomatic cover for the pressure on
Israel, the nuclear alert was a grander move than Eisenhower 1 s and Johnson 1 s
quiet use of the Sixth Fleet in similar circumstances. On October 25, the
U.S.S.R. softened its position and agreed to support a U.N. resolution calling
for a peacekeeping force composed of non-superpower troops. The proposal was
subsequently adopted, and with Israeli forces finally stopped, the crisis
ended in yet another mi 1 i tary deadlock.•
The Soviet Union was initially involved in this crisis at considerably
higher levels than the U.S. (see Table 4), but with changing battlefield
conditions and relatively uncontrollable clients, U.S. involvements escalated
to overt level 5. A seemingly panicky Soviet move to level 5 brought about
another American move at this level as well, along with serious diplomatic
pressure for a settlement.
Conclusions
Perhaps
because
of
the
Middle
East's
peculiar
geo-political
characteristics and repeated conflicts, patterns of simultaneous superpower
intervention have been remarkably stable over the years. During periods of
hostility and detente, with U.S. military dominance or relative parity, in the
midst of superpower expansiveness or retrenchment, the superpowers generally
employed some form of overt threathening military move (at level 5) in each
post-war crisis in the region. Only twice, in Lebanon, 1958, and during
Soviet combat intervention in the 1970 war of attrition, did they venture
beyond such tactics through 1975 (later the U.S. was to intervene again rather
disastrously in Lebanon during the Reagan administration). Passive military
involvements at level 5 generally were employed near the end of crises to
reinforce diplomatic demands, often demands on clients, and the powers
generally climbed down quite quickly.
While the overall patterns were fairly stable, competitive interventions
varied enough among crises to lend credence to certain of the hypotheses under
study. There was evidence that, as predicted in hypothesis 1, when level of
superpower interventions became nearly equal, especially at high levels, one
or the other power tended to withdraw or decrease involvements significantly.
The Soviets tended to back away, albeit with some military flourish, in both
Turkish crises when U.S. intervention reached level 5. Note that in the 1957
case, however, the U.S.S.R. escalated to that level after the U.S., and then
eased back. In the two Arab - Israeli wars (1967 and 73), the U.S. seemed to
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pull back somewhat in the face of stern Soviet warnings. Although both wars
ended with each superpower at level 5, Washington also applied significant
pacification pressures on its Israeli clients.
In a sense these findings also substantiate predictions in hypothesis 2,
in that the militarily subordinate or less traditionally interested superpower
tended to give way first. Prior to the mid-1960's, the U.S. tended to hold
sway in confrontations, with Moscow probing and testing the crisis waters but
Moscow was more
dropping claims in the face of heavy resistance.
traditionally interested in the area than Washington ( though not necessarily
than London), but faced unfavorable military odds. Washington had, of course,
done its share of probing and provoking in the 1957 dispute by bringing heavy
subversive pressure on Syria.
In the power transition and parity periods, however, both superpowers
calculated the limits of confrontation carefully, and tool<tne opponent's
signals that these limits were being breached quite seriously. Crisis
hot-line comnunications helped in this signalling. Note, however, that the
stakes were higher in these last two crises than in those on the Turkish
border since actual warfare had broken out. It was also politically easier
for the U.S. than the u.s.s.R. to give way in 1967 and 1973, since its client
ultimately was winning. Finally, it had also dawned on all parties that the
Middle East was an especially dangerous region, with important interests of a
number of major powers--including Europe and Japan--at stake. The superpowers
were aware that disastrous escalation could result more easily in such a
region than in places such as Africa, where more tangential interests and less
superpower competition prevailed.
However, the conflict resolution impact of superpower fencing at . level 5
in the Middle East must not be exaggerated, since in the Turkish Straits,
Iranian, and Turkish border disputes the local participants themselves
dampened the crises through shrewd diplomatic maneuvers. Pressures to find
such solutions may have been heightened by superpower intervention, and major
power diplomats coached their clients in ways to respond to outside pressures.
Superpowers' presence al so raised the dangers of Middle Eastern fighting and
prevented clear-cut victories.
The Soviet Union indeed seemed somewhat bolder in its Middle East
commitments and more credible in its threats once it had become a mature power
in the mid-sixties. The dispatch of Soviet pilots in 1970 testifies to this
new activism. However, the predictions of hypothesis 3, that powers would be
willing to challenge at higher intervention levels during especially expansive
periods, are only sporadically supported. The U.S. was relatively bold in
establishing pennanent naval commitments in the Mediterranean during crises in
the 1940s, but the U.S.S.R., also undergoing expansion, was more reticent.
The mid-fifties were not an especially expansive period for either power, yet
the U.S. articulated and sought to apply the Eisenhower Doctrine in Syria and
Lebanon. The superpowers were again rather expansive in the sixties, but
while assertive in the 1967 crisis, shadowed each other cautiously, mindful of
nuclear dangers, other commitments (Vietnam), and a nascent detente.
Commitment levels were still limited to passive military support in 1973, a
time of commercial if not military expansion (higher level Soviet intervention
in 1970 had come during a far less expansive period). Thus, expansiveness
seems to have l ittle overall impact on intervention levels.
It was

also

hypothesized

(#4)

that periods of high

tensions

and
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superpower hostilities would see the highest intervention levels and the least
willingness to give way. This was clearly not the case regarding intervention
levels, since all disputes saw level 5 involvements, regardless of tension
levels; both the cold war era of 1958 and the detente of 1970 also saw level 7
interventions.
During the first detente era, shortly after the Korean War, there were no
competitive Middle Eastern interventions, but al so few regional disputes to
stimulate interventions. This may have been due partly to a rather effective
arms supply limitation imposed on the region by the Western powers in the 1950
Tripartite Declaration, a limitation finally broken in the 1955 Czech Egyptian arms deal. While the U.S. called for similar arms supply restraint
in the 1960's (as Soviet commitments to Egypt soared), and the U.S.S.R. called
for them in the 70's (as U.S. supplies soared), no agreement was reached, and
the second detente period saw two bloody regi anal wars tempting superpower
interveners. These wars' seriousness, and a changed superpower military
balance, made the powers slightly less willing to give way during detente than
predicted in hypothesis 4; yet understandings facilitated by detente and a new
ease of crisis comnunication did temper their responses.
Thus, it appears that the level of mutual intervention and the prevailing
superpower military balance have the greatest impact on willingness to
escalate competitive interventions in crisis. Degree of conciliation in
superpower relations al so works marginally to dampen escalation. Degree of
superpower commerci a1 or mi 1 i tary expansiveness and rate of growth appear to
have little impact on crisis intervention. Clients' diplomatic inventiveness
and sensitivity to superpower demands and overcommitment are also important
components in ending crises before the powers become fatally entangled.
Sometimes the powers wi 11 aim the bulk of their intervening weight against
those very clients to restrain them and placate the opposing power.
Interpolating from these findings to the future is expremely problematic,
but it appears (admittedly from a limited sample of cases in one region of the
world) that the age of superpower parity has not fundamentally altered modes
of superpower crisis intervention. It has, however, slightly emboldened the
Soviets and made Washington somewhat more conscious of the need to back away
from confrontation. The U.S. again reached levels 6 and 7 in its Beirut
intervention of 1983, and the Soviets remained at level 4 in support of Syria.
But even in defending his commitment · of marines to support the Lebanese
government and pave the way for peace talks with Jordan, President Reagan
spoke of the proximity of the U.S.S.R. and the danger of confrontation if the
marines' mission were widened. Washington also bombed Libya (level 7) in 1986
and Soviet advisors evidently remained in their barracks (probably after prior
U• S. warn i ng ) •
In this and other regions of the world (notably Grenada, Nicaragua, and
Angola), the President may have hoped to embarrass the u.s.s.R. and its
clients. However, by moving marines less than 30 miles from Soviet military
personnel in Syria he increased the danger of confrontation. Yet even in the
the 1980s, in the midst of the bitterest U.S. - Soviet relations since the
early 1960's, and unprecedentedly large military buildups (expansiveness), at
least some of the mutual restraint born of the nuclear parity period, if not
earlier, is still in evidence.
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Turkish Straits
EVENT

DATE
March 1945

u.s.s.R. notifies Turkish Ambassador that
Soviet - Turkish Friendship treaty
will not be renewed without prior
revision of Montreux Convention.

LEVEL

overt,1

June 1945

u.s.s.R.

demands return of Turkish
provinces of Kars and Ardahan.

overt,2

June 1945

Soviet propaganda campaign initiated
against Turkish government, including
unofficial territorial demands.

overt,2

u.s. and Britain inform u.s.s.R. that the
Straits issue is of international
importance and should be decided by the U.N.

overt,1

Truman advises Soviets that the U.S. will
guarantee Turkey's sovereignty, and
instructs Istanbul to ask for .an internaational conference on Straits.

overt 2,3

Oct.-Nov.
1945

Soviets mobilize forces on the Turkish Bulgarian border.

overt, 5

Feb. 1946

U.S. begins naval courtesy calls to Turkey.
U.S. and U.K. help Turkey draft responses
to u.s.s.R., and U.K. renews AngloTurkish security treaty.

July 1945

August 1945

overt,5
covert,3
overt,5

U.S.S. Missouri returns Turkish
Ambassador's remains from Washington;
U.S. issues statement of support.

overt,2,5

June-July
1946

Soviets spend $150,000 for propaganda
efforts in Turkish elections.

covert,2,4

August 1946

Deadline for Montreux Convention revision;
u.s.s.R. files formal request, mobilizes
forces on Bulgarian border, and moves
Black Sea Fleet.

overt,1,5

Sept. 1946

Major U.S. naval exercises and pledge
to keep 6th Fleet on station.

overt,5

Mar. 1947

Truman Doctri ne announced.

(overt,4)

April 1946

Table 2.
Turkish-syrian Border

DATE

EVENT

LEVEL

July-Aug.,
1957

u.s.s.R. loans Syria economic and
military supplies.

overt,4

Aug. 13,
1957

U.S. diplomats expelled from Syria
for subversive activities.

covert,3

Aug. 20,
1957

Loy Henderson dispatched to Middle
East to assess Syrian situation.

Sept. 5,
1957

u.s.s.R.

Sept. 7,
1957

proposes major power
intervention pact.
U.S. airlifts military supplies to
Jordan, Lebanon, and Iraq.

overt,l
(and covert?),3
overt,l
overt,4

U.S. threatens to implement Eisenhower
Doctrine in Syria; moves Sixth Fleet
off Syrian coast.

overt,5

Sept. 13,
1957

Bulganin sends letter warning Turkish
Prime Minister not to interfere in
Syria.

overt,5

Sept. 19,
1957

Soviet naval squadron arrives in
Latakia, Syria.

overt,5

Sept. 20,
1957

Soviet Minister Gromyko warns U.S.
not to use force in Syria.

overt,5

Oct. 7,
1957

Khrushchev warns U.S. not to interfere in Syria.

overt, 5

Oct. 11,
1957

Khrushchev appeals to European
Socialist parties to help prevent
aggression in the Middle East.

overt,l

U.S. warns of counter-attack if
Soviets attack Turkey.

overt,2

Oct. 16,
1957
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Table 3
Six Day War

DATE
May 13, 1967

May 23, 1967

May 26, 1967

June 7, 1967

June 10, 1967

EVENT

LEVEL

U.S.S.R. sends Egypt false information on Israeli military build-up
on Syrian border.

covert,2

U.S. advises Israel not to act
militarily against Egyptian
blockade for at least 48 hours,
and warns Egypt of seriousness.

overt,3
overt,2

U.S. receives Minister Eban in
Washington and convinces him to
withhold military until diplomatic
channels exhausted.
u.s.s.R. advises Egyptian delegation
in Moscow not to initiate military
clash.

overt,3

u.s.s.R. and U.S. draft cease-fire
resolution in U.N., and apply
diplomatic pressure on clients.
U.S.S. Liberty attacked by Israeli
torpedoes while monitoring war.

overt,3

u.s.s.R. explicitly threatens
Israel on disregard of cease-fire
agreement.
U.S. repositions Sixth Fleet off
Syrian coast.

overt,3

covert,5

overt,5
overt,5
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Table 4
1973 Arab - Israeli War

EVENT

LEVEL

sends military supplies
and technicians to Egypt in preparation for coming war.

covert/overt,3,4

DATE
Sept.-Oct.,
1973

u.s.s.R.

Oct. 7,
1973

u.s.s.R. launches Middle East
propaganda attack, and issues
generalized threat to Israel.

overt, 2

Oct. 7-8,
1973

U.S. seeks diplomatic solution to
Middle East conflict in U.N.

overt,!

Oct. 8,
1973

u.s.s.R. appeals to Arab states to
support Egypt and Syria;
u.s.s.R. begins airlift of additional

overt,1

military supplies to Egypt.

overt,4

Oct. 12,
1.973

U.S. advises Israel to accept ceasefire proposals in U.N.

overt,3

Oct. 13,
1973

U.S. begins massive airlift of
military supplies to Israel;
Sixth Fleet located within striking
distance of Egypt.

overt,4

Oct. 16,
1973

Kosygin arrives in Egypt to negotiate
with Sadat.

overt,3

Oct. 22,
1973

U.S. and u.s.s.R. submit cease-fire
proposal in Security Council.

overt,!

Oct. 23,
1973

u.s.

Oct. 24,
1973

u.s.s.R.

and u.s.s.R. present second
cease-fire resolution in Council.

moves forces and threatens
unspecified unilateral action.
U.S. places forces on world-wide
alert and applies diplomatic
pressure on Israel.

overt,5

overt,1
overt,5
overt,5
overt/ covert,3

